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INTRODUCTION: A PRECAUTION AGAINST PRENUPS
In 1988, 23-year-old Barry Bonds was one of Major League
Baseball’s rising stars, averaging over 150 hits for the Pittsburgh Pirates
and making $106,000 a year.1 That same year, Barry married Sun Magreth,
a waitress and bartender, who previously emigrated to Canada from
Sweden.2 The two were married shortly after they met, and they entered 
into a prenuptial agreement under the laws of the State of California the 
day before their Las Vegas wedding.3 By signing this agreement, Sun
forfeited any right or interest in Barry’s future earnings or property.4 At 
the signing of the prenuptial agreement, Barry brought two of his lawyers
and his financial advisor for assistance.5 Contrastingly, Sun only brought
1. In re Marriage of Bonds, 5 P.3d 815, 817 (Cal. 2000); Barry Bonds
Statistics and History, BASEBALL REFERENCE, https://www.baseball-refer
ence.com/players/b/bondsba01.shtml [https://perma.cc/R2KP-JVKA] (last updated 
Aug. 23, 2020).
2. Bonds, 5 P.3d at 817.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 817–19.
5. Id.
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2021] COMMENT 1433
one friend from Sweden, and signed the prenuptial agreement at a time
when she had an insufficient understanding of its consequences because 
of her limited English skills.6 
By 1994, the National League had already named Barry Bonds the
most valuable player twice, exponentially increasing his pay to an average
of $7,166,667 a year while playing for the San Francisco Giants.7 Also in
1994, Barry and Sun were filing for divorce.8 The legal effects of the
couple’s 1988 prenuptial agreement would now unfold.9 Sun did not have
a claim to any of Barry’s increased wealth because she signed the
prenuptial agreement—a decision she had several million reasons to
regret.10 Unequitable conditions that exist at the execution of prenuptial
agreements can lead to results that cause one spouse, such as Sun, to be in
extreme financial detriment.11 
The laws governing matrimonial agreements in many states have
defined rules and guidelines to ensure that the agreements are voluntary
and equitable.12 Some states have principles and guidelines in place aimed
at avoiding an uninhibited contractual agreement that affects the assets and
legal relationship between spouses.13 For example, in Washington a
matrimonial agreement that is entered into fraudulently, involuntarily, or
overreachingly is considered invalid.14 Similarly, Texas courts will find
the agreement invalid if one of the parties did not enter into the agreement
voluntarily, or the agreement was executed unconscionably.15 An even
6. Id.
7. Murray Chass, BASEBALL; Giants Make Investment: $43 Million in
Bonds, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 6, 1992), https://www.nytimes.com/1992/12/06/sports
/baseball-giants-make-investment-43-million-in-bonds.html [https://perma.cc/8E
UR-ZFLZ].
8. Bonds, 5 P.3d at 817.
9. See generally id. at 817–19 (the validity of the couple’s premarital 
agreement became an issue before the California Supreme Court).
10. Id. at 817; Chass, supra note 7.
11. See generally Bonds, 5 P.3d at 817 (The California Supreme Court
ultimately held that the matrimonial agreement was entered into voluntary. This
upheld the matrimonial agreement as valid in creating a separate property regime.
Sun, therefore, was not entitled to half of Bond’s earnings as community
property).
12. See Cioffi-Petrakis v. Petrakis, 898 N.Y.S.2d 861 (N.Y. 2010).
13. Id.
14. Kellar v. Estate of Kellar, 291 P.3d 906 (Wash. Ct. App. 2012); In re
Marriage of Matson, 730 P.2d 668, 670 (Wash. 1986).
15. “[A]n unconscionable bargain has been regarded as one ‘such as no
(person) in his (or her) senses and not under delusion would make on the one
hand, and as no honest and fair (person) would accept on the other.’” Christian v.
353878-LSU_81-4_Text.indd  326 5/26/21  11:50 AM











   
  
   
  
   
  
    
   
  
      
  




     
           
        
      
    
       




   
   
   
    
   
    




   
  
1434 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81
greater limitation is put on couples seeking to enter into a matrimonial
agreement in California, where the California Family Code suggests
independent counsel for each party, and a waiting period for the signing
of the agreement is required if each party does not have an attorney.16 
Louisiana, too, has conditions for couples entering into matrimonial
agreements, specifically in the form of procedural hurdles.17 
In Louisiana, there is a default community property regime under
which couples share in their assets and liabilities; however, couples may 
enter into a matrimonial agreement to contract around the community
property regime.18 Couples may enter into these agreements either before
the marriage, through a prenuptial agreement, or during the marriage, by
a postnuptial agreement.19 In Louisiana, if a couple desires to enter into a
prenuptial agreement, like Barry and Sun, they must overcome procedural
hurdles before entering into the agreement.20 To validly establish their
prenuptial agreement, the spouses must execute the agreement by an
authentic act or an act under private signature duly acknowledged.21 An
authentic act is an act executed and signed by the parties before a notary
and two witnesses.22 An act under private signature duly acknowledged is
an act the parties privately execute, but the parties must later acknowledge
that their signatures are in fact their own either before a notary, a court, or
other authorized officer.23 
Christian, 365 N.E.2d 849, 855 (N.Y. 1977); UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT
ACT § 6, 9B U.L.A. 376 (1987); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-202 (2019); TEX.
FAM. CODE ANN. § 4.006 (West 1997); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 123A.080 (West
2019); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-3A-7 (West 2019); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 32-925 
(West 2019); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 766.58 (West 2019).
16. CAL. FAM. CODE § 1615 (West 2019). 
17. See generally LA. CIV. CODE art. 2329 (1980); id. art. 2331 (1979)
(establishing the requirements for creating a matrimonial agreement as petitioning
the court for a finding that the agreement serves the best interests of both parties
if executed during marriage and through act under private signature duly
acknowledged or authentic act if executed before the marriage).
18. Id. arts. 2340, 2329, 2331.
19. Id.
20. Id. art. 2331.
21. Id.
22. Id. art. 1833 (1984).
23. Id. art. 1836 (1984). “Other authorized officers” are persons considered
to be ex-officio notaries due to the position they hold. For example, an “other
officer” authorized to serve in this role would include any ambassador of the
United States to a foreign country. This would also include the holder of certain
public offices but for limited purposes of administering oaths and receiving sworn
statements such as a duly acknowledged signature. Examples of holders of public
353878-LSU_81-4_Text.indd  327 5/26/21  11:50 AM




   
   
     
  
   
 






   
  
  
   
     
     
   
   
 
    




   
     
  
       
    
      
  
    
      
   
   
      
     
 
   
       
   
2021] COMMENT 1435
For some time, Louisiana appellate courts disagreed as to whether the
acknowledgment of an act under private signature could take place at any
time during the marriage or had to take place before the marriage.24 The 
Louisiana Supreme Court recently resolved this question in Acurio v.
Acurio.25 The court decided that for a matrimonial agreement executed by
an act under private signature duly acknowledged to be valid, this
acknowledgment must take place before the marriage.26 In making this
decision, the Court emphasized the Louisiana Legislature’s intention at the
time of enacting Louisiana Civil Code article 2331, which sets forth the
requirements for spouses entering into a matrimonial agreement before
marriage.27 The legislature emphasized the protection of the spouses who 
entered into the matrimonial regime. Specifically, the legislature focused
on protecting spouses from: (1) being misled; (2) entering into an
agreement involuntarily; or (3) entering into a disadvantageous
agreement.28 According to the Court, the legislature added these
provisions to protect the “weaker,” or financially inferior, spouse.29 
While the holding maintained fundamental policies underlying the
enforceability of matrimonial agreements, it distorted the function of an
act under private signature duly acknowledged.30 When used outside of
the matrimonial regimes context, an act under private signature duly
acknowledged functions only as proof that a party’s signature is truly his
or her own.31 And, in those other contexts, it is clear that the
acknowledgement of the signature can take place either before or after the
offices that may be considered are clerks of court, court reporters, sheriff’s
deputies, and state game wardens. The governor of the state is also entitled to
appoint officers of the Department of Justice to be ex-officio notaries. Saul
Litvinoff & Ronald J. Scalise, The Law of Obligations, in 5 LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW
TREATISE § 12.16 (2d ed. 2018).
24. Lauga v. Lauga, 537 So. 2d 758 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1989); Ritz v. Ritz,
666 So. 2d 1181 (La. Ct. App. 5th Cir. 1995); Muller v. Muller, 72 So. 3d 364
(La. Ct. App. 5th Cir. 2011); Rush v. Rush, 115 So. 3d 508 (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir.
2013); Deshotels v. Deshotels, 150 So. 3d 541 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 2014); Acurio
v. Acurio, 197 So. 3d 253 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 2016).
25. Acurio v. Acurio, 224 So. 3d 935, 940 (La. 2017).
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. See Katherine Spaht & Cynthia Samuel, Equal Management Revisited:
1979 Legislative Modifications of the 1978 Matrimonial Regimes Law, 40 LA. L.
REV. 83, 89–90 (1979).
29. Id.
30. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1838 (1984).
31. Id.
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1436 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81
act takes legal effect.32 However, according to Acurio, this is not the case
in the context of premarital agreements, where the acknowledgement of
the parties’ act serves a cautionary, rather than evidentiary, function, and
must be completed before the act can have any effects.33 Through its
holding in Acurio, the Louisiana Supreme Court created a discrepancy in
the law governing the acknowledgment of acts—with one rule applying to
premarital agreements and another applying to other acknowledged acts.34 
As this paper demonstrates, this discrepancy will have consequences on
the application of the form requirement and hence the validity of many
other agreements in Louisiana law; therefore, the discrepancy must be 
rectified.35 To restore consistency within Louisiana’s law of
acknowledged acts while still effectuating the strong policy of protecting
the spouses that underlies the holding in Acurio, the legislature should
require the spouses entering into a matrimonial agreement to execute an
authentic act.36 
Part I provides background information on matrimonial agreements in
Louisiana and the policy behind the legislature’s intention for enacting
certain limitations on the creation of those agreements. Next, Part II
presents the circuit split regarding the temporal requirement for the
acknowledgment of premarital agreements executed by acts under private
signature. Part II also presents the Louisiana Supreme Court decision,
Acurio v. Acurio, which held that a matrimonial agreement must be
executed by an act under private signature duly acknowledged before the
parties’ marriage. Part III considers the form requirements provided in 
Louisiana Civil Code article 2331 for executing a matrimonial agreement
and the application and function of those requirements in Louisiana law.
Finally, Part IV discusses the requirements for executing valid
matrimonial agreements in other community property states and in France,
and compares them to those in Louisiana. Part V suggests that revising
Louisiana Civil Code article 2331 best rectifies the discrepancy created in
the Louisiana Supreme Court’s Acurio v. Acurio decision.
I. THE MATRIMONIAL AGREEMENT: A LIMITED FREEDOM OF CONTRACT
In Louisiana, the rules and principles of the matrimonial regimes
system govern a couple’s management of their property between each
32. Id.
33. See Acurio v. Acurio, 224 So. 3d 935, 940 (La. 2017).
34. See generally Jeffrey M. Surprenant, Acurio v. Acurio: Parens Patriae in
Marital Regimes, 64 LOY. L. REV. 257, 270 (2018).
35. Id.
36. See Acurio, 224 So. 3d at 940.
353878-LSU_81-4_Text.indd  329 5/26/21  11:50 AM




    
  
   
    
   
  
   
 
   
   
  
  
    
 
 
   
    
   
  
  
   
 
  
   
 
 
       
          
    
    
       
       
          





       
       
   
   
    
2021] COMMENT 1437
other and with third persons.37 A matrimonial regime is classified as either
a community property regime or a separate property regime.38 Under a 
separate property regime, the assets and gains that spouses accrue during 
their marriage are not automatically shared.39 Separate property is the
property that is considered to “exclusively” belong to the spouse who
acquired it.40 In contrast, under a community property regime, assets and
gains that a spouse acquires during the marriage are considered
community property, meaning those assets are shared between the
spouses.41 The community property regime is the default legal regime in
Louisiana, and there is a presumption that the possessions of a spouse
during the marriage are community property.42 The spouse attempting to
defeat this presumption must show, by a preponderance of the evidence,
that the property is separate.43 The strength of this presumption reflects
that Louisiana public policy favors the community property regime.44 
Additionally, there is a strong legislative policy favoring an absolute
freedom to contract for any lawful and possible purpose.45 Spouses also
have the freedom to enter into contracts with each other “as to all matters”
at any time either before or during their marriage.46 The law specifically
allows for spouses to contract around the default rule of community
property and alter their matrimonial regime by modifying the community
property regime, or instituting a separate property regime, where the
spouses each maintain separate rights over their separate assets and
liabilities.47 Spouses can accomplish this by entering into a matrimonial
agreement.48 A matrimonial agreement is a contract between the spouses 
that allows for a separation of some of their property, thus modifying the
37. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2325 (1979).
38. ANDREA B. CARROLL & ELIZABETH R. CARTER, LOUISIANA:
MATRIMONIAL REGIMES CASES & MATERIALS 1 (2014).
39. Id. at 2.
40. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2341 (1981).
41. CARROLL & CARTER, supra note 38, at 1.
42. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2327 (1979); id. art. 2340 (1979).
43. Talbot v. Talbot, 864 So. 2d 590, 600 (La. 2003) (“As a matter of public
policy and in the interest of fairness, we find that the community presumption
contained in article 2340 is rebuttable by either spouse upon a showing by a
preponderance of the evidence of the separate nature of property brought into the
community.”).
44. CARROLL & CARTER, supra note 38, at 114.
45. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1971 (1984).
46. Id. art. 2329 (1980).
47. Id. art. 2328 (1979).
48. Id.
353878-LSU_81-4_Text.indd  330 5/26/21  11:50 AM







   
   




    
   




    
    
    
  
  
   
  
    
  
    
   
 
     
    
        
    
 
      
        
   
   
   
  
 
   
   
1438 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81
legal regime between them.49 Additionally, a matrimonial agreement
allows couples to completely terminate that legal regime, or the
“community of acquets and gains,” that exists between them as spouses.50 
However, the spouses do not enjoy absolute contractual freedom when
entering into a matrimonial agreement.51 A matrimonial agreement has
certain limitations: it must not violate public policy and must meet the
necessary procedural requirements.52 
A. The Legislation of Matrimonial Agreements: Louisiana Civil Code 
Acts 627 and 709
Louisiana Civil Code Act 627 of 1978 allowed couples to enter into
matrimonial agreements before or during marriage and modify their
agreements during marriage.53 The Act eradicated the previous law that
prohibited spouses from generally forming interspousal contracts.54 This
Act was a drastic deviation from the former law, and was driven by the
desire to allow contractual freedom between the spouses during the
marriage—a desire that outweighed the fear of one spouse taking
advantage of another.55 During the 1979 Revision of the Matrimonial
Regimes title of the Civil Code, Act 709 replaced Act 627.56 A written
motion from a council member influenced the Louisiana Law Institute
Council to make this quick revision.57 The council member voiced a
concern that if spouses were able to modify the community property
regime during the marriage through a matrimonial agreement, nonworking
spouses would have “little or no ownership interest in [what would have
been community] assets or income” leading to a “substantial weakening 
of the community concept.”58 Act 709 maintained Act 627’s provisions 
that allowed spouses to enter into matrimonial agreements both before and
49. Id.; id. art. 2327 (1979).
50. Id. art. 2327.
51. See generally Spaht & Samuel, supra note 28.
52. “Persons may not by their juridical acts derogate from laws enacted for
the protection of the public interest. Any act in derogation of such laws is an
absolute nullity.” Id. art. 7 (1987); see id. art. 2329 (1980).
53. See Spaht & Samuel, supra note 28, at 89.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. The revision of the Matrimonial Regimes title during this period spanned
two years, receiving “more attention and deliberation than almost any comparable
legislation.” Id. at 145.
57. Id. at 91.
58. Id.
353878-LSU_81-4_Text.indd  331 5/26/21  11:50 AM





     
    





   
  
 
     
     
        
     
   
    
  








    
       
 
 
    
   
   
     
      
   
  
  
    
  




during the marriage and the ability to enter into other types of contracts
not related to the marriage.59 However, Act 709 added substantive and
procedural limitations for entering into matrimonial agreements during the
marriage that restrained the previous freedoms of Act 627.60 
B. Limitations of Public Policy
Under Act 709, spouses are restricted from entering into contracts that
substantively violate public policy.61 For example, the Louisiana Civil
Code prohibits agreements that limit or renounce the marital portion,62 
change the line of succession,63 limit the spouses’ right to obligate the
community property as to third persons,64 or regulate the spouses’ sexual
59. Andrea Carroll & Richard D. Moreno, Matrimonial Regimes, in 16 
LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE § 5.1 (4th ed. 2018).
60. See Spaht & Samuel, supra note 28, at 89.
61. Kathy D. Underwood, Louisiana Notary Handbook, in LOUISIANA 
PRACTICE SERIES § 7.8 (2019–20 ed), Westlaw LAPRAC-NOTARY § 7:8.
62. “When a spouse dies rich in comparison with the surviving spouse, the
surviving spouse is entitled to claim the marital portion from the succession of the
deceased spouse.” LA. CIV. CODE art. 2432 (1979).
The marital portion is one-fourth of the succession in ownership if the
deceased died without children, the same fraction in usufruct for life if
he is survived by three or fewer children, and a child's share in such
usufruct if he is survived by more than three children. In no event,
however, shall the amount of the marital portion exceed one million
dollars.
Id. art. 2434 (1979).
63. The line of succession in a community property regime is the property
descendants, then the spouse. Id. art. 888 (1982); id. art. 889 (1982). The line of
succession in a separate property regime is the decedents, then siblings or parents
of the decedents, then the spouse, then other ascendants, then other collateral
relatives. Id. arts. 891–96 (1982).
64. Louisiana Civil Code article 2345 specifies, “A separate or community
obligation may be satisfied during the community property regime from
community property and from the separate property of the spouse who incurred
the obligation.” Id. art. 2345 (2020). Therefore, spouses cannot specify in the
matrimonial agreement that when entering into agreements with third parties that
their community property will not be obligated in the agreement. For example,
[W]hen a spouse seeks unsecured credit, the creditor can rely on the
power given the spouse under the legal regime by [Louisiana Civil Code 
article 2345] to create a personal obligation that satisfied out of
community property. The creditor need not concern himself with
whether that spouse is disabled by his matrimonial agreement from
obligating the community property without the other spouse’s consent.
353878-LSU_81-4_Text.indd  332 5/26/21  11:50 AM




    
 
    
  








       
  
 
        
     
    
      
   
       













           
         
  
  
   
   
     
  
1440 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81
relations.65 Otherwise, spouses are free to enter into any matrimonial
agreements that do not violate these specific conditions or defy public
order.66 Both agreements entered into during the marriage, known as
postnuptial agreements, and agreements entered into before the marriage,
known as prenuptial agreements, cannot violate public policy and must
follow specific procedural instructions.67 
C. The Procedure Behind Matrimonial Agreements: Louisiana Civil
Code Articles 2329 and 2331 
Spouses may enter into a matrimonial agreement that terminates or
alters the matrimonial regime either before or during the marriage.68 
Louisiana Civil Code article 2329 dictates that postnuptial agreements are
legally enforceable only if the couple files a joint petition with the court
and the court finds that the agreement “serves their best interests69 and
[that] they understand the governing principles and rules.”70 The spouses 
See Carroll & Moreno, supra note 59, § 6.7; id. art. 2345 (1979).
65. David L. Sigler et al., Estate Planning in Louisiana, in 1 LOUISIANA
PRACTICE SERIES § 4.5 (2018-2019 ed.), Westlaw LAPRAC-EP § 4:5.
66. Underwood, supra note 61, § 7.8.
67. Id. 
68. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2329 (1980).
69. It is not easy for a judge to determine whether a matrimonial agreement
is in the best interests of the spouses, as the agreement will usually financially
benefit one spouse over the other. “Best interests” is not defined in Louisiana Civil
Code article 2329 and may apply to more than just financial benefits. Scholars
suggest that a judge may use his discretion in determining whether the agreement
was in the parties’ best interests and to inquire into whether the spouses entered
the agreement voluntarily. However, Louisiana Civil Code article 2329 does not
give any guidance to judges on the procedure they should follow in determining
what is in the parties’ best interests. Likewise, there are no articles in the Louisiana 
Code of Civil Procedure or Revised Statutes that lend to this guidance. It is also
worth noting that, in contrast to French law, the judge need only find that the
agreement is in the best interest of the spouses, and not of the family. Although
the finding does not need to concern the best interests of the children, it may still
affect them regarding the effect that classification of property has on heirship. See 
Carroll & Moreno, supra note 59, § 8.6; LA. CIV. CODE art. 2329 (1980).
70. See Carroll & Moreno, supra note 59, § 8. The Louisiana First Circuit Court
of Appeal has held that when the spouses’ attorneys advise them on entering into
the matrimonial agreement, the agreement may be in the spouses’ best interests and
that the spouses understand the governing rules and principles. Matter of Boyer, 616 
So. 2d 730, 732 (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1993). However, the Fifth Circuit has held 
that even if parties enter into an agreement without the aid of counsel, those
agreements may still be in the best interests of and fully understood by the parties.
353878-LSU_81-4_Text.indd  333 5/26/21  11:50 AM




   
   
  
   
     
    
    
  
  






   
  
     
           
 
     
  
      
    
   
   
 
 
    
 
    
  
     
     
        
   
        
   
  
 
   
   
      
2021] COMMENT 1441
must obtain court approval to form a valid contract.71 This procedural
requirement inevitably demands the commencement of judicial
proceedings.72 It would not be unusual for the parties to hire a lawyer and
to appear in court to receive judicial approval.73 Indeed, the agreement
itself is what alters the matrimonial regime between the spouses; the court
approval is a formality that gives the matrimonial agreement its full legal
effects.74 The Louisiana Law Institute Council added the formality of court
approval as a requirement under Louisiana Civil Code article 2329
because of their concern for protecting the community property regime.75 
The Louisiana Supreme Court held that the purpose of requiring a joint
petition76 is to “protect a less worldly, economically vulnerable spouse
Instead, the court made this finding based on affidavits by the parties asserting that
the agreement was in their best interests and that they understood it. Bendetto v.
Bendetto, 182 So. 3d 344 (La. Ct. App. 5th Cir. 2015). The judge may question the
spouses as to their understanding of the agreement, but scholars suggest that as long 
as the spouse who lacks thorough understanding of the agreement has not been
pressured into the agreement by the other spouse, the judge should approve the
agreement. See Spaht & Samuel, supra note 28, at 95.
71. See Spaht & Samuel, supra note 28, at 90; LA. CIV. CODE art. 2329
(1980).
72. Scholars suggest that “any district court in the state” would be an
appropriate court to hear the judicial proceeding of a joint petition under
Louisiana Civil Code article 2329. Carroll & Moreno, supra note 59, § 8.6; 
Underwood, supra note 61, § 7.9.
The freedom to choose any court would seemingly give the spouses a
choice to petition the court in a parish in which they believe the judges are more
willing to find that their matrimonial agreement meets the requirements of serving
their best interests and that they understand the governing rules and principles.
See Spaht & Samuel, supra note 28, at 94. It is also suggested that these 
proceedings can take place in chambers, without the parties actually appearing
before the judge, or with the judge communicating with the spouses over the
phone or in writing. There is no statute that explicitly provides for a procedure
that must be followed to jointly petition the court. Carroll & Moreno, supra note
59, § 8.6; Underwood, supra note 61, § 7.9.
73. Carroll & Moreno, supra note 59, § 8.6.
74. Id. 
75. See Spaht & Samuel, supra note 28, at 91.
76. Spouses who desire to enter into a matrimonial agreement during their
marriage must only petition the court if they wish to alter their property regime
from a community property regime to a separate property regime. If the spouses
are forming a matrimonial agreement to return from a separate property regime
back to the default community property regime, they do not need to petition the
court. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 2329 (1980).
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1442 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81
from an overreaching spouse.”77 Scholars have interpreted the general
purpose of protecting the “weaker” spouse as “usually” protecting the
“stereotypically weak wife” from the husband’s undue influence in
entering into a matrimonial agreement that will be to her detriment.78 
Spouses may alternatively want to enter into a matrimonial agreement
before their marriage to avoid the community property regime altogether.79 
The spouses electing to enter into a matrimonial agreement prior to
marriage must execute the agreement either by authentic act or by act
under private signature duly acknowledged.80 The interplay between the
procedural requirements of Louisiana Civil Code article 2329 for entering 
into matrimonial agreements during the marriage and the requirements of
Louisiana Civil Code article 2331 for entering into matrimonial
agreements before the marriage became a recurring theme in Louisiana 
appellate courts that decided the validity of matrimonial agreements.81 The 
courts continuously read Louisiana Civil Code articles 2329 and 2331 in 
tandem.82 As such, the courts decided that the requirement under Louisiana
Civil Code article 2329 for court approval was only required for spouses
executing a matrimonial agreement during the marriage.83 As such, the
requirements under Louisiana Civil Code article 2331 are conditions
exclusively for spouses executing a matrimonial agreement before
77. Radcliffe 10, L.L.C. v. Burger, 219 So. 3d 296, 302 (La. 2017).
78. Carroll & Moreno, supra note 59, § 8.6.
79. Underwood, supra note 61, § 7.8.
80. Id. art. 2331 (1979). The agreement does not have to be recorded to be
valid but must be recorded to be effective against third parties.
A matrimonial agreement, or a judgment establishing a regime of
separation of property is effective toward third persons as to immovable
property, when filed for registry in the conveyance records of the parish
in which the property is situated and as to movables when filed for
registry in the parish or parishes in which the spouses are domiciled.
Id. art. 2332 (1979); see Carroll & Moreno, supra note 59, § 8.5; see
Underwood, supra note 61, § 7.8.
81. See Lauga v. Lauga, 537 So. 2d 758 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1989) ; Ritz v.
Ritz, 666 So. 2d 1181 (La. Ct. App. 5th Cir. 1995); Muller v. Muller, 72 So. 3d
364 (La. Ct. App. 5th Cir. 2011); Rush v. Rush, 115 So. 3d 508 (La. Ct. App. 1st
Cir. 2013); Deshotels v. Deshotels, 150 So. 3d 541 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 2014);
Acurio v. Acurio, 197 So. 3d 253 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 2016).
82. Lauga, 537 So. 2d 758; Ritz, 666 So. 2d 1181; Muller, 72 So. 3d 364;
Rush, 115 So. 3d 508; Deshotels, 150 So. 3d 541; Acurio, 197 So. 3d 253.
83. Lauga, 537 So. 2d 758; Ritz, 666 So. 2d 1181; Muller, 72 So. 3d 364;
Rush, 115 So. 3d 508; Deshotels, 150 So. 3d 541; Acurio, 197 So. 3d 253.
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2021] COMMENT 1443
marriage.84 Of particular importance, the courts have held that the
requirements of the article must be fully executed before the marriage.85 
II. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT AND THE FIX
Through a series of decisions beginning in 1989, Louisiana’s appellate
courts, and ultimately the Louisiana Supreme Court, held that a premarital
agreement made by act under private signature must be duly
acknowledged prior to the parties’ marriage in order for the act to have
any effects.86 The legislature’s purpose behind the introduction of
Louisiana Civil Code article 2329’s procedural obstacles was to protect
“less worldly spouses” who may find themselves in a disadvantageous
agreement prior to marriage.87 As such, the Louisiana First, Third, Fourth,
and Fifth Circuit Courts of Appeal interpreted the requirements for
entering into prenuptial agreements as stringent requirements, more
stringent than what a strict interpretation of the relevant code articles 
normally required.88 Only one appellate court in Louisiana, the Second
Circuit in Acurio v. Acurio, strayed from this strict interpretation.89 
However, the Louisiana Supreme Court reversed the Second Circuit’s
outlying decision and adopted the view espoused in the majority of
Louisiana appellate courts, which instituted heightened burdens for
spouses entering into matrimonial agreements.90 
A. Undivided Appellate Courts
Various Louisiana courts have addressed whether a matrimonial
agreement executed before a marriage was valid.91 However, the decisions
of the appellate courts predominately hinged on whether the matrimonial
84. Lauga, 537 So. 2d 758; Ritz, 666 So. 2d 1181; Muller, 72 So. 3d 364;
Rush, 115 So. 3d 508; Deshotels, 150 So. 3d 541; Acurio, 197 So. 3d 253.
85. Lauga, 537 So. 2d 758; Ritz, 666 So. 2d 1181; Muller, 72 So. 3d 364;
Rush, 115 So. 3d 508; Deshotels, 150 So. 3d 541; Acurio, 197 So. 3d 253.
86. See Acurio v. Acurio, 224 So. 3d 935, 936 (La. 2017).
87. See Lauga, 537 So. 2d 758; Ritz, 666 So. 2d 1181; Muller, 72 So. 3d 364;
Rush, 115 So. 3d 508; Deshotels, 150 So. 3d 541; Acurio, 197 So. 3d 253; Spaht
& Samuel, supra note 28, at 92.
88. See Lauga, 537 So. 2d 758; Ritz, 666 So. 2d at 1181; Muller, 72 So. 3d
364; Rush, 115 So. 3d 508; Deshotels, 150 So. 3d 541; Acurio, 197 So. 3d 253.
89. Acurio, 197 So. 3d 253.
90. See Acurio, 224 So. 3d at 936.
91. See Lauga, 537 So. 2d 758; Ritz, 666 So. 2d 1181; Muller, 72 So. 3d 364;
Rush, 115 So. 3d 508; Deshotels, 150 So. 3d 541; Acurio, 197 So. 3d 253.
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1444 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81
agreements92 met the law’s procedural requirements.93 Specifically, each 
court ultimately had to decide whether the procedural requirements
associated with entering a matrimonial agreement before the marriage— 
execution of an authentic act or execution and acknowledgment of an act
under private signature—also had to occur before the marriage.94 In
interpreting Louisiana Civil Code articles 2331 and 2329 together, the
majority of Louisiana appellate courts concluded that spouses must validly
complete the form requirements of Louisiana Civil Code article 2331
when entering into a matrimonial agreement before the marriage for the
agreement to be valid.95 To do this, the spouses must either validly execute
an authentic act or validly execute an act under private signature duly 
acknowledged before the marriage.96 If executed via an act under private
signature, the parties must acknowledge the signature before the
marriage.97 If these requirements are not met, the matrimonial agreement
is not considered valid, triggering Louisiana Civil Code article 2329’s
joint-petitioning-of-the-court requirement.98 
1. Fourth Circuit: Lauga v. Lauga
In 1989, the Fourth Circuit addressed the issue of whether two
matrimonial agreements executed by spouses both before and during the
marriage were valid.99 In Lauga v. Lauga, the court found that both
agreements were invalid because the agreements were not executed
92. When spouses execute a matrimonial agreement, they form a marital
contract; therefore, the agreement is subject to the same laws that govern
contracts. As such, matrimonial agreements require the consent of both parties. A 
court may find a matrimonial agreement invalid if “error fraud or duress” vitiates
one party’s consent, just as in most other contracts. See Carroll & Moreno, supra
note 59, § 8.2; LA. CIV. CODE art. 1948 (1985).
93. See Lauga, 537 So. 2d 758; Ritz, 666 So. 2d 1181; Muller, 72 So. 3d 364;
Rush, 115 So. 3d 508; Deshotels, 150 So. 3d 541; Acurio, 197 So. 3d 253.
94. Lauga, 537 So. 2d 758; Ritz, 666 So. 2d 1181; Muller, 72 So. 3d 364;
Rush, 115 So. 3d 508; Deshotels, 150 So. 3d 541; Acurio, 197 So. 3d 253.
95. Lauga, 537 So. 2d 758; Ritz, 666 So. 2d 1181; Muller, 72 So. 3d 364;
Rush, 115 So. 3d 508; Deshotels, 150 So. 3d 541; Acurio, 197 So. 3d 253.
96. Lauga, 537 So. 2d 758; Ritz, 666 So. 2d 1181; Muller, 72 So. 3d 364;
Rush, 115 So. 3d 508; Deshotels, 150 So. 3d 541; Acurio, 197 So. 3d 253.
97. Lauga, 537 So. 2d 758; Ritz, 666 So. 2d 1181; Muller, 72 So. 3d 364;
Rush, 115 So. 3d 508; Deshotels, 150 So. 3d 541; Acurio, 197 So. 3d 253.
98. Lauga, 537 So. 2d 758; Ritz, 666 So. 2d 1181; Muller, 72 So. 3d 364;
Rush, 115 So. 3d 508; Deshotels, 150 So. 3d 541; Acurio, 197 So. 3d 253.
99. Lauga, 537 So. 2d at 760.
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2021] COMMENT 1445
properly under Louisiana Civil Code articles 2331 and 2329.100 Ray Lauga 
was convicted of a felony and sent to a federal penitentiary in Lexington,
Kentucky.101 The next day, Ray and Wanda Nelson executed a
matrimonial agreement which established a separate property regime.102 
One day later, Ray married Wanda while incarcerated.103 Ray remained
incarcerated for almost a year, and upon his return to Louisiana, the
Laugas entered into a second matrimonial agreement that reiterated the
language of the first agreement.104 The Fourth Circuit ultimately held that
the matrimonial agreement executed the day before the marriage was
invalid.105 The court concluded that the agreement did not meet the 
requirements set out in Louisiana Civil Code article 2331 because the
couple did not execute the agreement by authentic act or by an act under
private signature duly acknowledged.106 The court reasoned that the 
requirement in Louisiana Civil Code article 2331 that a matrimonial
agreement “shall be made by authentic act or by an act under private
signature duly acknowledged” is a compulsory requirement for entering
into a matrimonial agreement prior to marriage.107 Although the Laugas
did not meet these requirements under their first matrimonial regime
before their marriage, their subsequent matrimonial agreement adhered to
these requirements.108 However, the Fourth Circuit held that because the
Laugas entered into this agreement during their marriage, the requirements
of Louisiana Civil Code article 2329 must have been met, and a joint
petition and a finding of the court must have been made for the agreement
to be valid.109 
100. Id.
101. Although Ray Lauga was incarcerated in Kentucky, which is not a
community property state, the community property laws of Louisiana still applied
to the agreement. Ray’s involuntary incarceration in Kentucky did not change his
domicile, and the parties did not intend to change their domiciles to Kentucky in
the matrimonial agreement. Id. at 759–60.
102. Id. at 759.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 760.
106. Id.
107. Id.; LA. CIV. CODE art. 2331 (1979).
108. Lauga, 537 So. 2d at 760; id. art. 2331.
109. Lauga, 537 So. 2d at 760–61.
353878-LSU_81-4_Text.indd  338 5/26/21  11:50 AM




   
 
     
     
     
  
  






   
   
   
 
    
   
       
   




   
     
     
 
     
   
    
   
   
   
     
    
   
   
   
1446 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81
2. Fifth Circuit: Ritz v. Ritz
In 1996, the Fifth Circuit faced the same issue of determining whether
a matrimonial agreement executed before a marriage was valid.110 Like the
Fourth Circuit, the Fifth Circuit in Ritz v. Ritz held the agreement invalid
because it did not meet the proper form requirements, but expanded this
holding even further, stating that these requirements must be properly
executed before the marriage.111 On the night before their wedding, Craig
Ritz gave his fiancé Carolyn a “marriage contract” and told her that he
would only marry her if she signed it.112 Carolyn signed six copies of the 
document, but no one witnessed the execution or signed the contract
alongside her.113 Once married, the couple agreed to tear up the documents
and from then on handle their property as community property.114 Upon 
an inspection of the public records, Carolyn discovered that Craig never
recorded the marriage contract.115 The Fifth Circuit decided that the issue
of whether the matrimonial agreement was valid depended upon whether
the agreement was executed validly before the marriage.116 The Fifth 
Circuit reasoned that both authentic acts and acts under private signature
duly acknowledged must be made before the marriage to have a valid
matrimonial agreement.117 The act in the instant case failed to qualify as
an authentic act because the person who signed the act as a witness to the
agreement did not in fact witness Craig and Carolyn sign the agreement,
and he did not sign the document until after the marriage.118 The court
recognized that because Carolyn admitted in her deposition and in court
that she signed the agreement, it was duly acknowledged, thus qualifying
the agreement as an act under private signature.119 However, no 
acknowledgement took place before or during the marriage.120 The Fifth
Circuit reasoned that the acknowledgment required in Louisiana Civil
Code article 2331 must take place before the marriage to have a valid
110. Ritz v. Ritz, 666 So. 2d 1181, 1185 (La. Ct. App. 5th Cir. 1995).
111. Id.




116. Id. at 1184.
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2021] COMMENT 1447
matrimonial agreement.121 Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit subsequently
held that the agreement was invalid.122 
3. First Circuit: Rush v. Rush
In 2013, the First Circuit also decided that for a matrimonial
agreement executed before a marriage to be valid, the parties must
properly meet the form requirements prior to the marriage.123 In Rush v. 
Rush, the court held that the failure of either spouse to properly
acknowledge their signatures before the marriage made the agreement
ineffective.124 Randall and Lynn Rush executed a matrimonial agreement
establishing a separate property regime the month before their marriage.125 
The couple signed the document before a notary; however, no witness
signed the document.126 Randall filed for divorce and executed an 
acknowledgement by authentic act of his signature on the agreement.127 
Lynn also recognized, during discovery proceedings, that she signed the
document, but refused to make a formal acknowledgment of her
signature.128 
The First Circuit then decided whether the matrimonial agreement was
valid, a question it determined was based on whether the agreement was
in valid form.129 The First Circuit ultimately decided that because the 
agreement was not acknowledged until over 18 years after the marriage
and no court approval was obtained to form the agreement, it was invalid. 
The court reasoned that Louisiana Civil Code articles 2331 and 2329 must
be read in pari materia.130 The First Circuit held that Louisiana Civil Code
article 2331 does not place a temporal requirement for the spouses to
acknowledge their signatures, meaning this article does not specify if the
acknowledgement must take place before or during the marriage.131 
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Rush v. Rush, 115 So. 3d 508, 512 (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 2013).
124. Id.
125. Id. at 510.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 510–12.
129. Id. at 511.
130. Id. at 511–12. When Louisiana Civil Code articles are to be read or
interpreted in pari materia, this means that they are to be interpreted “in reference
to each other.” Pierce Founds., Inc. v. Jaroy Const., Inc., 190 So. 3d 298, 303 (La.
2016).
131. Rush, 115 So. 3d at 512.
353878-LSU_81-4_Text.indd  340 5/26/21  11:50 AM




     
   
  
   
   
  
   
   
 
     
 
  
    
     
 
   
   
    
      
     
   
  
   





    
    
 
   
    
   
   
   
     
   
   
    
   
1448 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81
However, the court did note that Louisiana Civil Code article 2329
requires a couple to jointly petition the court and seek court approval of a
matrimonial agreement if they wish to terminate a community property
regime during the marriage.132 Further, the First Circuit held the 
matrimonial agreement invalid in form as an authentic act because of the 
absence of witnesses and because the matrimonial agreement was not an
act under private signature duly acknowledged.133 The agreement was not
such an act because although the execution of the matrimonial agreement
took place prior to the marriage, the acknowledgment of the signatures did
not take place until during the marriage.134 As such, the spouses did not
complete the required forms of Louisiana Civil Code article 2331 prior to
the marriage and did not properly modify the matrimonial agreement
during the marriage under the requirements of Louisiana Civil Code article
2329.135 Consequently, the court held the matrimonial agreement
invalid.136 
4. Third Circuit: Deshotels v. Deshotels
In Deshotels v. Deshotels, the Third Circuit followed the logic of the
other circuits when it held that a signature acknowledged in court does not
meet the necessary requirement of Louisiana Civil Code article 2331 that
a prenuptial agreement must be executed by an act under private signature
duly acknowledged.137 Alverda Deshotels filed for a divorce from her
husband Seldon.138 During property partition proceedings, Seldon
contended that no community property regime ever existed between the
couple because of a “marriage agreement” he filed in the public records.139 
The Third Circuit noted that for a contract under Louisiana Civil Code
article 2331 to be valid, the couple must execute it in accordance with the
specified form requirements.140 The court also noted that the Deshotels 
entered into a matrimonial agreement prior to their marriage, or a
prenuptial agreement.141 Therefore, the court reasoned, all of the elements 






137. Deshotels v. Deshotels, 150 So. 3d 541, 543 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 2014).
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 544.
141. Id.
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2021] COMMENT 1449
agreement to be valid.142 The parties stipulated that the agreement was not
executed by an authentic act, and Alverda acknowledged her signature on
the “marriage agreement” only during court proceedings.143 The Third
Circuit held that the matrimonial agreement occurring before marriage was
invalid, as it did not perfect all of the form requirements of Louisiana Civil
Code article 2331.144 Like the other circuits in the majority, the Third 
Circuit found that the necessary form requirements of Louisiana Civil
Code article 2331 must be met before the marriage for a matrimonial
agreement to be valid.145 
B. Second Circuit Detour: Acurio v. Acurio
In 2016, the Second Circuit took a left turn from the decisions of other
circuits.146 A split developed among the circuits because of the Second
Circuit’s decision in Acurio v. Acurio that an act under private signature
need not be duly acknowledged prior to the marriage.147 Danielle Deon
Acurio and Dr. Michael Thomas Acurio married in 1998 and divorced two
years later.148 However, the couple remarried two years after their
divorce.149 Before their second marriage, they decided to enter into a 
matrimonial agreement.150 Danielle and Michael executed an agreement
entitled “The Prenuptial Agreement” four days before their second
wedding.151 Danielle drafted the agreement that would create a separate
property regime between the couple.152 The Acurios remained married for
seven years and conducted their finances under a separate property regime
as they had agreed to in the prenuptial agreement.153 
The Second Circuit noted that Louisiana Civil Code article 2329,
which applies to matrimonial agreements that take place during marriage,
did not apply to this case because the matrimonial agreement executed
between the Acurios took place before their marriage.154 The Second




146. See Acurio v. Acurio, 197 So. 3d 253 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 2016).
147. Id. at 257.





153. Id. at 255.
154. Id. at 257.
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1450 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81
Circuit contended that addressing Louisiana Civil Code article 2329 and
applying it to the Acurios’ situation would “negate” the relevant articles
that do apply and that allow for spouses to enter into matrimonial
agreements prior to marriage.155 The court reasoned that, instead, because 
this was an agreement taking place before the marriage, it should be
executed under Louisiana Civil Code article 2331—by an authentic act or
an act under private signature duly acknowledged.156 The parties signed 
the agreement before a notary, but only one witness, thus failing to meet
the requirements of an authentic act.157 The issue remained for the court as 
to whether the parties sufficiently executed the agreement as an act under
private signature duly acknowledged.158 The Second Circuit specifically
pointed to the lack of a temporal requirement set forth in the Code under
which a private signature must be acknowledged and reasoned that this 
acknowledgment is simply a recognition by the parties that the signature
on the act is their own.159 Notably, the Acurios did not acknowledge their
signatures on the agreement until their depositions.160 However, the court
held that the Louisiana Civil Code does not require parties to a
matrimonial agreement to acknowledge their signatures before the
marriage for the agreement to be valid.161 
The Second Circuit reasoned that it would be “nonsensical” to require
a party to “immediately” acknowledge his or her signature for it to have
legal effect.162 The court also held that imposing the requirement of
immediate acknowledgment defeats the legislature’s purpose of giving
options in Louisiana Civil Code article 2331 of executing a matrimonial
agreement by either authentic act or by an act under private signature duly
acknowledged.163 Further opining that the need for acknowledgement of
the signatures only arises once the parties are married, the Second Circuit
conclusively held that acknowledgment of a signature does not need to be
present prior to the marriage.164 The Acurios’ prenuptial agreement was
therefore valid as both parties signed the agreement and acknowledged
that the signatures were their own.165 
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 254.
158. Id. at 257
159. Id.
160. Id. at 256.
161. Id. at 257.
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2021] COMMENT 1451
C. The Louisiana Supreme Court: Acurio v. Acurio
In 2017, the Louisiana Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari in 
Acurio v. Acurio to definitively determine whether parties must duly
acknowledge their signatures prior to the marriage for the matrimonial
agreement to be valid.166 The Louisiana Supreme Court decided that
whether parties to a matrimonial agreement duly acknowledged their
signatures before or after the marriage was an issue of form that
determined the validity of the agreement.167 
The Louisiana Supreme Court considered matrimonial agreements
nominate contracts.168 The Court then held that according to Louisiana 
Civil Code article 1916, matrimonial agreements, as nominate contracts,
were subject only to the special rules governing the respective matrimonial
regimes title.169 The Court, therefore, reasoned it was incorrect to rely on
the general rules of obligations regarding an act under private signature
duly acknowledged, which clearly stated that such an act could be 
acknowledged at any time.170 The Court held that in following the articles
governing matrimonial agreements, proof was elevated “to a matter of
form.”171 This form then required that the parties to a matrimonial
agreement executed by an act under private signature duly acknowledged
must acknowledge their signature before the marriage.172 
The Louisiana Supreme Court noted that Louisiana Civil Code articles
2331 and 2329 must be read in pari materia.173 The Court highlighted the
requirement of court approval to enter a matrimonial agreement during
marriage that couples must seek under Louisiana Civil Code article 2329
as a conscious legislative decision to put a burden on spouses who choose
to contract around the community property regime.174 The Court noted that
it was the legislature’s intent to make a couple’s decision to alter the 
community regime a “task that requires effort.”175 The Louisiana Supreme
Court further interpreted this requirement, in combination with the
166. See Acurio v. Acurio, 224 So. 3d 935, 940 (La. 2017).
167. Id.
168. Nominate contracts are those given a special designation such as a contract
for sale, lease, loan, or insurance. Innominate contracts are those with no special
designation. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1914 (1985); see Acurio, 224 So. 3d at 940.
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1452 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81
requirements under Louisiana Civil Code article 2331, as the legislature’s 
specific intention to create procedural barriers.176 The legislature put these
procedural hurdles in place so that couples would contemplate their
decision to waive the default rights of the community property regime— 
the regime that the Louisiana Civil Code and public policy favor.177 
The Court also acknowledged the significance that the two options for
executing a matrimonial agreement—by either an authentic act or by an
act under private signature duly acknowledged—are in the same code
article.178 The Court reasoned that allowing for either the execution of a
matrimonial agreement by the arduous requirements of an authentic act or
by signing the agreement and then only later acknowledging it led to
“superfluous” and “unbalanced” options.179 The Court interpreted the
placement of these two options alongside one another as an indication that
the legislature sought to require an act under private signature duly
acknowledged to match the burdensome task that an authentic act requires
for execution.180 
Further, an agreement executed by authentic act is given immediate
legal significance and presumed valid because of the method of its
execution.181 The Louisiana Supreme Court reasoned that an act under
private signature duly acknowledged, when used to execute a matrimonial
agreement, should have this same immediate significance of an authentic
act.182 The Court held that the requirement of acknowledgment had the
same temporal requirements as an authentic act.183 Accordingly, the Court
stated that having the requirement that the parties duly acknowledge their
signatures located in the same code article as the requirement that the act
be under private signature makes the requirement serve both an
evidentiary function and a form, or cautionary, requirement.184 
Specifically, the singular code article that establishes both a function of
proof and the manner in which the act is executed displays the evidentiary
function and the form requirement of the act.185 The Court stated this gives
a matrimonial agreement executed by an act under private signature duly
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id.; LA. CIV. CODE art. 2331 (1979).





184. Id. at 940.
185. Id.
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2021] COMMENT 1453
acknowledged a temporal requirement—that the parties must sign and
duly acknowledge the act before the marriage.186 
The Court considered the legislature’s intention to ensure that a couple
wishing to execute a matrimonial agreement give “due consideration,” as 
well as the procedural requirements of both Louisiana Civil Code articles
2331 and 2329, when it held that an act under private signature duly 
acknowledged must be executed before the marriage.187 Therefore, the
Acurios’ failure to acknowledge their signatures before their marriage
caused their matrimonial agreement to be invalid.188 
The Louisiana Supreme Court decision appears to clearly state that an 
act under private signature duly acknowledged must take place before the
marriage to have a valid matrimonial agreement.189 However, this decision
raises issues among scholars because it contrasts with established 
provisions in the Louisiana Civil Code.190 The Louisiana Civil Code does
not expressly implicate a time requirement for when parties must duly 
acknowledge an act executed under private signature.191 Therefore, the
Louisiana Supreme Court’s decision in Acurio v. Acurio conflicts with the
established understanding of duly acknowledging acts under private
signature as well as its function within the Louisiana Civil Code’s general
scheme for form requirements.192 
III. FORM REQUIREMENTS: ROLE IN THE LOUISIANA CIVIL CODE AND 
PRACTICAL APPLICATION
The Louisiana Civil Code’s general scheme provides the function and 
method of execution of both an act under private signature duly
acknowledged and an authentic act.193 Both an authentic act and an act
under private signature duly acknowledged are form requirements that
have legal effects after execution, which are explicitly described in the
Louisiana Civil Code.194 Significantly, when the Louisiana Civil Code 
requires an authentic act as a form requirement, an act under private
signature cannot serve as a substitute because the two do not provide the
186. Id.
187. Id. at 939–40.
188. Id. at 940.
189. Id.
190. See generally Surprenant, supra note 34.
191. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1836 (1985).
192. See Acurio, 224 So. 3d at 940; id. art. 1836. 
193. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1833 (1984); Acurio, 224 So. 3d at 940; id. art. 1836
(1985).
194. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1833 (1984); id. art. 1836 (1985).
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1454 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81
same function.195 Because an authentic act and an act under private
signature duly acknowledged do not have the same function, their methods
of execution are not the same.196 However, the Louisiana Supreme Court
disregarded the Louisiana Civil Code’s distinction between the two forms
when it decided that spouses must duly acknowledge an act under private
signature before marriage in Acurio v. Acurio.197 
In Acurio, the Louisiana Supreme Court correctly reasoned that a
couple should face procedural hurdles that force them to contemplate their
decision when entering into a matrimonial agreement that disrupts the
favored community property regime.198 However, an act under private
signature duly acknowledged will not have this effect, even if executed
before marriage, because it is not sufficiently cautionary.199 The Court
incorrectly placed substantial weight on the location of the option for an
act under private signature duly acknowledged coinciding with an
authentic act in the matrimonial regimes title and ignored the effect of
these requirements in other titles of the Code.200 The Court reasoned that
the legislature created equal alternatives when it gave two procedural
options for the creation of a matrimonial agreement.201 However, the Court
failed to recognize the relative role of those form requirements elsewhere
in the Code.202 
A. Obligations in General: The Universal Rules
The Court’s holding, while correctly analyzing the matrimonial
regimes section of the Code, lacked proper contemplation of the general
rules of obligations.203 Matrimonial agreements are nominate contracts; 
therefore, both the matrimonial regimes section of the Code and the 
general rules of conventional obligations and obligations in general govern 
195. Litvinoff & Scalise, supra note 23, § 12.34; Succession of Harper v.
Frederick-Harper, No. 14-1567, 2015 WL 1882759 (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. Apr. 24,
2015).
196. Litvinoff & Scalise, supra note 23, § 12.34.
197. Peter S. Title, Louisiana Real Estate Transactions, in 1 LOUISIANA
PRACTICE SERIES § 7.11 (2d ed. 2018), Westlaw LAPRAC-RE § 7:11.
198. See Acurio, 224 So. 3d 935.
199. See Surprenant, supra note 34, at 270.
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 204. Robert C. Lowe, Louisiana Divorce, in LOUISIANA PRACTICE SERIES § 
4.15 (2019), Westlaw LAPRAC-DIV § 4:15. 
 205. Id. 
 206. Id. 
 207. Carroll & Moreno, supra note 59, § 5.1. 
 208. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1833 (1984). 
 209. Id. 
 210. A signature for purposes of an authentic act is a “handwritten inscription 
indicating the name of the person making the declarations contained in the 
instrument,” and in circumstances that a party does not know or is unable to 
inscribe his or her name, the Louisiana Supreme Court has held that the person’s 
act of making his or her mark on the writing is sufficiently considered a signature. 
See Litvinoff & Scalise, supra note 23, § 12.19. 
 211. Id. art. 1833 (1984). 
 212. Carroll & Moreno, supra note 59, § 5.1. 
 213. Id. 
 214. Litvinoff & Scalise, supra note 23, § 12.34; Succession of Harper v. 





matrimonial agreements.204 As such, the function of the requirements for
the execution of matrimonial agreements should be understood not
exclusively within their own title of the Code, but with respect to the Code
as a whole.205 An understanding of the proper application of Louisiana 
Civil Code article 2331, located in the title on Matrimonial Regimes,
requires a careful reading of articles 1833 through 1836, found among the
provisions governing Proof of Obligations.206 
B. The Authentic Act: A Cautionary Requirement
The authentic act plays a role in the context of executing not only
matrimonial agreements, but also agreements that fall under many
different titles of the Louisiana Civil Code.207 An authentic act is valid
only if the parties to the contract meet certain form requirements.208 The 
act must be a writing that is executed before a notary in the presence of
two witnesses.209 The notary, the witnesses, and the parties who executed
the act must sign210 the act.211 Executing an act in this way ensures that the
act itself proves it legitimacy.212 A self-proving act is one that a party can
enter into court as evidence to prove the validity of the agreement
contained within the act.213 An act is considered authenticated because “it
proves without more” that the parties participated in what is indicated in
the act.214 The presence of the notary at the time of execution leads to the
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1456 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81
indication that the act is accurate and truthful.215 An authentic act is
therefore presumed to be genuine.216 
The authentic act also serves a cautionary function.217 A cautionary 
function to a form requirement guarantees that the parties who are entering
into the act are aware of that act’s legal effects.218 The authentic act
provides a cautionary function because it requires a notary and two
witnesses.219 The procedural barriers of an authentic act ensure the parties 
to the agreement fully understand and consent to the agreement they are
entering.220 The cautionary measures that the parties take when authentic 
acts are used to execute agreements further the understanding of the parties
and ensure their full consent.221 
Each procedural requirement serves a purpose.222 For example, the
requirement of a present notary223 creates an element of accuracy and
indicates the seriousness of the act.224 Importantly, the notary’s
signature225 proves that the notary witnessed the act’s valid execution.226 
Further, the Louisiana Civil Law Treatise notes that the requirement to
execute the act before a notary adds significance and formality to the
procedural process.227 
In all civil law jurisdictions, the notary’s position is honorable and
reliable because of the duties and expectations attached to the
profession.228 Historically, a notary was a public witness to the acts of
private parties.229 Still today, the civil law notary is a “trusted non-judicial 
peacemaker,” giving legal advice to harmonize the interests of both
parties.230 The notary is legally bound to ensure that the act will not be 
215. Succession of Tete, 7 La. Ann. 95, 96 (La. 1852).
216. DiVincenti v. McIntryre, 611 So. 2d 140, 141 (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1992).
217. See Surprenant, supra note 34, at 263.
218. Id. at 262.
219. Id. at 263–64.
220. Id.; LA. CIV. CODE art. 196, 368, 213 (2009).
221. Id. art. 1833 (1984).
222. See Litvinoff & Scalise, supra note 23, §§ 12:15, 12:23.
223. A person wishing to be a notary must be a licensed attorney or pass a test. Id.
224. Id.
225. The signature of the notary is authenticated at the secretary of state’s
office, where an original of the notary’s signature must be registered. Litvinoff &
Scalise, supra note 23, §§ 12.17, 12.22.
226. Id.; C. ALAN JENNINGS ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF LOUISIANA NOTARIAL
LAW AND PRACTICE 8 (2014).
227. Litvinoff & Scalise, supra note 23, § 12.17.
228. See JENNINGS ET AL., supra note 226, at 5.
229. Litvinoff & Scalise, supra note 23, § 12.15.
230. JENNINGS ET AL., supra note 226, at 8.
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2021] COMMENT 1457
annulled later due to the circumstances under which the parties executed
it.231 He or she often re-reads and re-explains the act for the parties to
emphasize and highlight the contents of the act.232 
The legislature intentionally added the presence of a notary
requirement to ensure that authentic acts serve their cautionary function
and cause the parties to reflect on the gravity of their commitments.233 For 
example, a party must execute an authentic act to refuse an interest in an
inter vivos trust of an immovable.234 By giving up this interest, a person is 
giving up their role as a beneficiary, or the ability to receive any benefits
of the trust.235 The beneficiary does not need to accept the role of receiving 
interest in the trust as it is presumed.236 Therefore, to rebut the presumption 
of an interest in an inter vivos trust, the beneficiary must execute an
authentic act, which “unequivocally” renounces their interest in the
trust.237 
Similarly, if a wife intends to donate her interest in community 
property to her spouse, thereby making it separate property, she must
execute an authentic act.238 For the act to be valid, she must execute this
donation gratuitously and in the proper authentic form.239 Even in the
alternative, if she wants to transfer her separate property into the
community, thereby giving up half of her interest in that property to her
spouse, she must execute an authentic act.240 Regardless of his or her
intentions, a heightened form requirement is mandatory when a spouse
intends to give up interest in his or her property.241 
There are, however, acts that can be executed by either an authentic
act or by an act under private signature duly acknowledged.242 Some of
these include: the modification or waiver of spousal support; a spouse’s
reservation of the natural fruits, civil fruits, and revenues from separate
property; and the proof of a right to use executory process to enforce a
231. Id.
232. Litvinoff & Scalise, supra note 23, § 12.17.
233. Id.
234. LA. REV. STAT. § 9:1985 (1964).
235. Id. § 9:1801 (1964).
236. Id.
237. See id. § 9:1985.
238. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2343 (1979).
239. Lowe, supra note 204, § 9:50.
240. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2343.1 (1979).
241. See id. art. 2343, 2343.1 (1979).
242. Id. art. 116 (1998); id. art. 2339 (1980); LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art. 2635 
(1989); LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art. 1836 (1985).
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1458 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81
mortgage for immovables.243 Parties are given the option to execute these 
agreements by either authentic act or by an act under private signature duly
acknowledged, much like the option parties are given when executing
matrimonial agreements.244 When parties choose to execute one of these
agreements by an act under private signature duly acknowledged, there is
no temporal requirement.245 Thus, the parties may acknowledge their
signatures at any time.246 The absence of a time requirement is consistent
with how an act under private signature duly acknowledged functions
elsewhere in the Louisiana Civil Code.247 
C. The Act under Private Signature Duly Acknowledged: An Evidentiary
Requirement
Once a party acknowledges his signature on the act he intends to
execute, an act under private signature duly acknowledged248 is a true
act249 of that party.250 To acknowledge his signature, a party must
recognize the signature as his own before two witnesses and before either
the court, a notary, or other officer authorized to perform such function.251 
Once the party acknowledges his signature, the signature is recognized
prima facie252 as the genuine act of the party and can be “entered in
243. LA. CIV. CODE art. 116 (1998); LA. CIV. CODE art. 2339 (1980); LA. CODE 
CIV. PROC. art. 2635 (1989); LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art. 1836 (1985).
244. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 116 (1998); LA. CIV. CODE art. 2339 (1980); LA.
CODE CIV. PROC. art. 2635 (1989); LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art. 1836 (1985).
245. LA. CIV. CODE art. 116 (1998); LA. CIV. CODE art. 2339 (1980); LA. CODE
CIV. PROC. art. 2635 (1989); LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art. 1836 (1985).
246. LA. CIV. CODE art. 116 (1998); LA. CIV. CODE art. 2339 (1980); LA. CODE
CIV. PROC. art. 2635 (1989); LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art. 1836 (1985).
247. LA. CIV. CODE art. 116 (1998); LA. CIV. CODE art. 2339 (1980); LA. CODE
CIV. PROC. art. 2635 (1989); LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art. 1836 (1985).
248. This type of acknowledgment is called the “Civil Code” acknowledgment
because Louisiana Civil Code article 1836 expressly authorizes this form. Title, 
supra note 197, § 7.11. It is also called an authenticated private act. Dian Tooley
Knoblett & David Gruning, Sales, in 24 LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE § 6.14
(2018).
249. “An act under private signature is regarded prima facie as the true and 
genuine act of a party executing it when his signature has been acknowledged,
and the act shall be admitted in evidence without further proof.” LA. CIV. CODE
art. 1836 (1985) (emphasis added).
250. Id.
251. Id.
252. “Prima facie” is defined as “[s]ufficient to establish a fact or raise a
presumption unless disproved or rebutted; based on what seems to be true on first
353878-LSU_81-4_Text.indd  351 5/26/21  11:50 AM






    
       
   
 
  
     
    
  
    
  
    
    
   
 
     
  
  








    
        
           
       
       
   
    
      
   
   
        
   
            
          
      
       
2021] COMMENT 1459
evidence without further proof.”253 For example, once the party to the act
acknowledges that his signature is in fact his, the modification or waiver
of spousal support; a spouse’s reservation of the natural fruits, civil fruits,
and revenues from separate property; and the proof of a right to use an
executory process to enforce a mortgage for immovables are genuine
acts.254 
No statute expressly provides that the acknowledgment of signatures
must take place prior to the act having an effect.255 This requirement, thus,
does not create the act’s legal effect, but only serves the function of
proving that the parties’ signatures are theirs.256 The acknowledgment of a
signature serves solely as an evidentiary form requirement, rather than a
cautionary one.257 An act under private signature duly acknowledged is
unlike an authentic act in that its requirements do not create a presumption
of authenticity.258 Parties must acknowledge or deny that the signatures
provided on the act are in fact theirs.259 Upon acknowledgment, the act is 
given evidentiary weight, or is effective as proof of the signatures.260 
Because a notary does not re-read or re-explain the act to the parties in
front of witnesses as done in an authentic act,261 the parties are less likely
to be aware of the significance of entering into the agreement or endorsing
the contract because the extra undertakings that are associated with a
notary are not present.262 
An act under private signature duly acknowledged operates as a
procedural form requirement in other areas of the law, but the requirement
in these areas serves solely an evidentiary function.263 For example, the
execution of an act under private signature duly acknowledged serves an 
evidentiary function when executing an inter vivos trust.264 Either an
examination, even though it may later be proved to be.” Prima Facie, BLACK'S 
LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
253. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1836 (1985).
254. Id. art. 116 (1998); id. art. 2339 (1980); LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art. 2635 
(1989); LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art. 1836 (1985).
255. Litvinoff & Scalise, supra note 23, § 12.32.
256. Id. 
257. Id. § 8.7.
258. Id. § 12.31.
259. Id.
260. Id.
261. See Spaht & Samuel, supra note 28, at 92.
262. Id.
263. See generally LA. CIV. CODE art. 116 (1998); LA. CIV. CODE art. 2339
(1980); LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art. 2635 (1989); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
12:1309(B); LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art. 1836 (1985).
264. LA. REV. STAT. § 9:1752 (1964).
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1460 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81
authentic act or an act under private signature duly acknowledged can be
used to execute an inter vivos trust.265 In Francois v. Tufts, the Louisiana
Fourth Circuit interpreted the Louisiana Trust Code’s requirements for
executing an inter vivos trust.266 Specifically, the court decided whether
the act under private signature must have been duly acknowledged at the 
same time that it was signed.267 The court ultimately held that Louisiana
Civil Code article 1836 does not require an act under private signature to 
be simultaneously acknowledged and signed.268 Thus, an inter vivos trust
executed by an act under private signature and later acknowledged is still 
a valid trust.269 
Similarly, amendments to the articles of a limited liability company
can be made by either acknowledgement of at least one of the members
who signed the articles of amendment or by the execution of an authentic
act.270 In Metro City Redevelopment Coalition, Inc. v. Brockman, the
Louisiana First Circuit Court of Appeal held an article of amendment was
valid when a party to the amendment appeared before a notary and two
witnesses and acknowledged his signature on the amendment.271 In
Brockman, the husband allowed his wife to sign the amendment, but only
he acknowledged the signature.272 The court held that this amendment was 
properly executed as an act under private signature duly acknowledged.273 
The use of Louisiana Civil Code article 1836 in the context of articles of
amendment clearly indicates that it serves an evidentiary purpose.274 The
Louisiana First Circuit Court of Appeal held that it was inconsequential if
the party did in fact sign the amendment.275 The husband’s
acknowledgement that the signature was his own made the amendment
valid.276 The authorization of an act under private signature duly
acknowledged has only been elevated to a cautionary role when it is
265. Id.




270. LA. REV. STAT. § 12:1309(B).
271. Metro City Redevelopment Coal., Inc. v. Brockman, 143 So. 3d 495, 501
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2021] COMMENT 1461
hindered with a temporal requirement—in the context of matrimonial
agreements.277 
D. Acurio’s Obscure Application of the Form Requirements
The Louisiana Supreme Court’s decision in Acurio v. Acurio, 
imposing a time condition under which the parties must duly acknowledge
their signatures, inevitably gave the form requirement of an act under
private signature duly acknowledged a cautionary effect.278 But the
procedural limitation contained in Louisiana Civil Code article 2331 that
the spouses must duly acknowledge an act under private signature neither
provides that the parties must immediately acknowledge the act nor
contains any express time period under which the parties must satisfy the
requirement.279 
Mr. Acurio was correct in suggesting that the Court should consider
Louisiana Civil Code article 1836 when evaluating whether a signature
duly acknowledged has a time requirement.280 Louisiana Civil Code article
1836 provides the definition and requirements for a private signature duly
acknowledged.281 Specifically, it provides that an acknowledged signature
is considered a “true and genuine act of the party.”282 The purpose of
executing a duly acknowledged act under private signature is the
signatures of the parties, which indicates that the policy behind this form
is solely evidentiary.283 
It is inconsequential that the duly acknowledged signature at issue is
related to a matrimonial agreement because the rules governing duly
acknowledged signatures in the context of matrimonial agreements are
identical when governing other aspects of the law on this matter.284 No
matter the area of the law in which the parties use the form requirement to
execute an act under private signature duly acknowledged, courts
deciphering the validity of the act should uniformly apply its 
requirements.285 
277. See Acurio v. Acurio, 224 So. 3d 935, 940 (La. 2017).
278. Id.
279. See Carroll & Moreno supra note 59, § 8.7; Title, supra note 197, § 7.11.
280. See Acurio, 224 So. 3d at 940.
281. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1836 (1984).
282. Id. 
283. See id. art. 1838.
284. Id. art. 1915–16.
285. Leigh B. Ackal, What’s Mine Is Yours, or Is It: The Bright Line between
Marital Agreements Executed before Marriage and Those Executed after
Marriage, 91 TUL. L. REV. 789, 794 (2017).
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1462 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81
The Civil Code is the “solemn expression of legislative will.”286 The 
Code itself instructs that each article should not be read independently, but
in conjunction with related articles.287 Considering these fundamental
principles, it is not appropriate to “simply ignore some laws passed by the
legislature in favor of others.”288 Those reading and interpreting the 
Louisiana Civil Code should view it as a comprehensive work to ensure
“that no section, clause, or word becomes superfluous and 
meaningless.”289 
Although the Acurio Court’s imposition of a temporal requirement for
the acknowledgment of a matrimonial agreement is inconsistent with the
general law of obligations, it furthers the important policies underlying the
implementation of prerequisites for the execution of a matrimonial
agreement.290 The Court’s holding reflects a desire to protect a vulnerable
spouse from a disadvantageous agreement that would unfairly strip the
spouse of important property rights.291 Although the Court enforces this
policy, it is not merely judicial; as noted in Acurio and other appellate
court opinions, the legislature’s administration of form requirements for a
matrimonial agreement reflects the legislature’s will to protect the weaker
spouse.292 Considering that the act under private signature duly 
acknowledged serves only evidentiary, rather than cautionary functions,
the legislature’s choice to permit the execution of a premarital agreement
by the more lenient requirement of an act under private signature duly
acknowledged is not sound.293 Considering the legislature’s intention to
enact law that would protect spouses when entering into contracts, it
should not have ratified this less rigorous option when the opportunity for
one spouse to take advantage of another is possible.294 Certainly, the
legislature should not have offered this permissive requirement where the
286. Id. art. 2 (1987).
287. Id. art. 13.
288. See Ackal, supra note 285, at 798.
289. Barilleaux v. NPC, Inc., 730 So. 2d 1062, 1064–65 (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 
1999).
290. See Acurio v. Acurio, 224 So. 3d 935, 940 (La. 2017).
291. Id.
292. See Lauga v. Lauga, 537 So. 2d 758; Ritz v. Ritz, 666 So. 2d 1181 (La.
Ct. App. 5th Cir. 1995); Muller v. Muller, 72 So. 3d 364 (La. Ct. App. 5th Cir.
2011); Rush v. Rush, 115 So. 3d 508 (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 2013); Deshotels v.
Deshotels, 150 So. 3d 541 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 2014); Acurio v. Acurio, 197 So.
3d 253 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 2016); see also Spaht & Samuel, supra note 28, at 
90; LA. CIV. CODE art. 2329 (1979).
293. See Spaht & Samuel, supra note 28, at 90; LA. CIV. CODE art. 2329
(1979).
294. Spaht & Samuel, supra note 28, at 90; id. art. 2329.
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alteration of the community property regime is concerned, considering the
strong legislative intent and public policy in favor of protecting the
regime.295 Spouses should not be able to validly execute a matrimonial
agreement by an act under private signature duly acknowledged, as this
would violate the established policy of protecting the community property
regime that has a strong foundation in Louisiana.296 
IV. MATRIMONIAL AGREEMENTS OUTSIDE OF LOUISIANA: OTHER 
COMMUNITY PROPERTY STATES AND FRANCE
Protecting the community property regime is a strong policy that is
rooted in Louisiana’s history as one of the minority of American states that
follow community property laws.297 Louisiana is one of nine states in the
United States298 that operate under a default community property 
regime.299 Indeed, Louisiana is the only state in the United States that
practices under the civil law; therefore, it arguably has the original,
strongest, and “historically purest” community property system in the
United States.300 The Louisiana civil law has the procedural barriers of an 
authentic act or act under private signature duly acknowledged in place for
spouses attempting to contract around the default community property
regime.301 These procedural barriers, perhaps surprisingly, are not the most
stringent or protective among the community property states.302 
295. Spaht & Samuel, supra note 28, at 90; id. art. 2329.
296. See Spaht & Samuel, supra note 28, at 90; id. art. 2329; CARROLL &
CARTER, supra note 38, at 7.
297. See CARROLL & CARTER, supra note 38, at 7.
298. Puerto Rico also operates under a default community property regime,
and Alaska and Tennessee allow couples to choose a community property system
for their marriage. Id.
299. Id.
300. Id.
301. See id. art. 2331.
302. See generally Christian v. Christian, 365 N.E.2d 849, 855 (N.Y. 1977);
UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT § 6, 9B U.L.A. 376 (1987); ARIZ. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 25-202 (2019); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 4.006 (West 1997); NEV.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 123A.080 (West 2019); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-3A-7 (West 
2019); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 32-925 (West 2019); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 766.58 (West
2019).
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1464 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81
A. Other Community Property States: A Small but Mighty Group
Louisiana, California, Washington, Arizona, Texas, Nevada, New
Mexico, Idaho, and Wisconsin operate under a default community
property regime.303 The majority of these states can trace their community 
property regimes to Spain and France.304 While Louisiana functions as a
civil law system, the remaining eight states have adopted the traditional
civil law ideology of a community property regime into their common law
legal systems.305 
1. California: Representation or Full Understanding 
California has a more stringent form requirement than Louisiana for
entering matrimonial agreements.306 For a California court to consider a
premarital agreement valid, the party against whom the agreement is being
enforced must have independent legal counsel.307 The party, however, may
waive counsel in an independent writing after having been advised to seek
counsel.308 If the party chooses to waive counsel, he must have at least
seven days between the initial time the other party presented him with the
agreement and when he was advised to seek legal counsel and the eventual
signing of the agreement.309 If a party waives counsel, he must be fully 
303. See CARROLL & CARTER, supra note 38, at 7.
304. Id.
305. Id.
306. See UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT § 6, 9B U.L.A. 376 (1987);
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-202 (2019); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 4.006 (West
1997); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 123A.080 (West 2019); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-
3A-7 (West 2019); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 32-925 (West 2019); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 
766.58 (West 2019).
307. See UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT § 6, 9B U.L.A. 376 (1987);
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-202 (2019); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 4.006 (West
1997); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 123A.080 (West 2019); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-
3A-7 (West 2019); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 32-925 (West 2019); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 
766.58 (West 2019).
308. See UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT § 6, 9B U.L.A. 376 (1987);
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-202 (2019); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 4.006 (West
1997); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 123A.080 (West 2019); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-
3A-7 (West 2019); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 32-925 (West 2019); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 
766.58 (West 2019).
309. See UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT § 6, 9B U.L.A. 376 (1987);
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-202 (2019); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 4.006 (West
1997); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 123A.080 (West 2019); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-
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2021] COMMENT 1465
informed of all the basic effects of the agreement and the rights he is giving 
up by signing the agreement.310 The counsel of the represented party must
provide the unrepresented party with an explanation of his rights in writing
and in a language the unrepresented party is proficient in.311 The 
unrepresented party must then sign a document before the premarital
agreement is signed declaring that he received the explanation of his rights
and understood them.312 California’s stringent requirements emphasize
protecting both spouses and ensure the spouses have full knowledge of
their rights.313 These regulations were the result of legislative action taken
in response to the dispute that arose over the aforementioned prenuptial
agreement between Barry Bonds and Sun.314 
2. Washington: Substantive or Procedural Fairness
Washington law also ensures that demanding requirements are in
place for spouses entering into prenuptial agreements.315 In Washington,
for a premarital agreement to be valid, it must either be substantively or
3A-7 (West 2019); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 32-925 (West 2019); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 
766.58 (West 2019).
310. See UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT § 6, 9B U.L.A. 376 (1987);
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-202 (2019); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 4.006 (West
1997); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 123A.080 (West 2019); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-
3A-7 (West 2019); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 32-925 (West 2019); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 
766.58 (West 2019).
311. See UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT § 6, 9B U.L.A. 376 (1987);
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-202 (2019); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 4.006 (West
1997); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 123A.080 (West 2019); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-
3A-7 (West 2019); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 32-925 (West 2019); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 
766.58 (West 2019).
312. See UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT § 6, 9B U.L.A. 376 (1987);
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-202 (2019); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 4.006 (West
1997); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 123A.080 (West 2019); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-
3A-7 (West 2019); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 32-925 (West 2019); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 
766.58 (West 2019).
313. See UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT § 6, 9B U.L.A. 376 (1987);
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-202 (2019); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 4.006 (West
1997); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 123A.080 (West 2019); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-
3A-7 (West 2019); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 32-925 (West 2019); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 
766.58 (West 2019).
314. J. Gordon Hylton, Barry Bonds’ Contribution to the Growth of American
Law, MARQUETTE UNIVERSITY LAW SCHOOL FACULTY BLOG (Oct. 20, 2009),
https://law.marquette.edu/facultyblog/2009/10/barry-bonds’-contribution-to-the-
growth-of-american-law [https://perma.cc/VL97-SE3K].
315. Kellar v. Estate of Kellar, 291 P.3d 906 (Wash. 2012).
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1466 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81
procedurally fair.316 Washington courts consider an agreement to be
substantively fair if it contains provisions that are “fair and reasonable” in
favor of the party who is not seeking to enforce the agreement.317 “[F]air
and reasonable” provisions do not contain any overreaching or fraud.318 If
the court considers the agreement to be substantively fair, then the
agreement as a whole is considered fair.319 The court only takes an inquiry
into procedural fairness if the agreement is considered substantively
unfair.320 The court considers the agreement procedurally fair if the parties 
(1) fully disclosed the amount, value, and character of their property; (2)
were both represented by independent counsel; (3) entered into the
agreement freely and voluntarily; and (4) had full knowledge of their
rights.321 The substantive or procedural fairness requirement ensures that
the parties are entering into the agreements voluntarily and knowingly.322 
3. The Uniform Premarital Agreement Act: Arizona, Texas, Nevada, 
New Mexico, Idaho, and Wisconsin
The remaining community property states—Arizona, Texas, Nevada,
New Mexico, Idaho, and Wisconsin—embrace the Uniform Premarital
Agreement Act, which is used in other common law states323 as well.324 It
guarantees legitimate agreements between the parties in which they are
fully aware of the effects of the agreement.325 The procedures set forth in
316. Id.
317. Matter of Marriage of Matson, 730 P.2d 668, 670–71 (Wash. 1986).
318. Id.
319. See Kellar, 291 P.3d 906.
320. Id.
321. Id. at 913–14.
322. Id. at 913.
323. Twenty-eight states have adopted the Uniform Premarital Agreement Act.
Uniform Premarital and Marital Agreements Act, 46 FAM. L. Q. 345 (2012); Joanna
L. Groassman, “Dot the i’s and Cross the t’s”: Louisiana Supreme Court Voids
Prenuptial Agreement for Signature Defect, VERDICT (May 23, 2017),
https://verdict.justia.com/2017/05/23/dot-cross-ts [https://perma.cc/5ALC-ZXVZ].
324. See UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT § 6, 9B U.L.A. 376 (1987);
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-202 (2019); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 4.006 (West
1997); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 123A.080 (West 2019); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-
3A-7 (West 2019); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 32-925 (West 2019); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 
766.58 (West 2019).
325. See UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT § 6, 9B U.L.A. 376 (1987);
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-202 (2019); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 4.006 (West
1997); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 123A.080 (West 2019); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-
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2021] COMMENT 1467
the Act require that the premarital agreement be in writing and that both
parties sign the agreement.326 The Act ensures that consideration for
entering into the agreement is not required.327 The agreement becomes
effective upon marriage.328 The court will find the agreement invalid if one
of the parties did not enter into the agreement voluntarily or the agreement
was executed unconscionably.329 Unconscionability is likely to be found
if one of the spouses did not reasonably disclose his or her financial and
property obligations or ownership, or a right to such disclosure was not
expressly waived.330 The court will also likely find the agreement to be 
involuntary or unconscionable if one of the parties did not or could not
have reasonable knowledge of the other party’s financial and property
assets and obligations.331 The National Conference of Commissioners for
3A-7 (West 2019); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 32-925 (West 2019); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 
766.58 (West 2019).
326. See UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT § 6, 9B U.L.A. 376 (1987);
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-202 (2019); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 4.006 (West
1997); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 123A.080 (West 2019); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-
3A-7 (West 2019); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 32-925 (West 2019); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 
766.58 (West 2019).
327. See UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT § 6, 9B U.L.A. 376 (1987);
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-202 (2019); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 4.006 (West
1997); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 123A.080 (West 2019); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-
3A-7 (West 2019); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 32-925 (West 2019); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 
766.58 (West 2019). “Consideration” is defined as “[s]omething (such as an act,
a forbearance, or a return promise) bargained for and received by a promisor from
a promisee; that which motivates a person to do something, esp. to engage in a
legal act.” Consideration, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
328. UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT § 6, 9B U.L.A. 376 (1987); ARIZ.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-202 (2019); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 4.004 (West 1997);
NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 123A.060 (West 2019); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-3A-5
(West 2019); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 32-924 (West 2019); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 766.58
(West 2019).
329. See UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT § 6, 9B U.L.A. 376 (1987);
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-202 (2019); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 4.006 (West
1997); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 123A.080 (West 2019); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-
3A-7 (West 2019); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 32-925 (West 2019); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 
766.58 (West 2019).
330. See UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT § 6, 9B U.L.A. 376 (1987);
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-202 (2019); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 4.006 (West
1997); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 123A.080 (West 2019); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-
3A-7 (West 2019); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 32-925 (West 2019); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 
766.58 (West 2019).
331. See UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT § 6, 9B U.L.A. 376 (1987);
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-202 (2019); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 4.006 (West
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1468 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81
Uniform State Laws promulgated these regulations as an aim to create
consistent national guidelines.332 
B. An International Comparison: French Law
Countries around the world regulate matrimonial agreements.333 
Internationally, most countries operate under a community property
regime.334 For example, Continental Europe, specifically France, utilizes
a community property system.335 Prenuptial agreements affect spouses in
France in much the same way as they do in the community property
jurisdictions of the United States.336 In fact, Louisiana’s historic 
community property system originated in the Spanish and French
possessions before the Louisiana Territory became the property of the
United States in 1803.337 After the French sold the Louisiana Territory to 
the United States, the territory maintained its civil law tradition inherited
from Spain and France; therefore, Louisiana maintained the civil law
tradition of community property.338 The French Civil Code heavily 
influenced the first Louisiana Civil Code of 1808 and its subsequent
revisions in 1825 and 1870.339 However, the Louisiana Civil Code is more
lenient than the French Civil Code on spouses entering matrimonial
agreements that alter the community property regime.340 
French Civil Code article 1394 requires that matrimonial agreements
be executed before a notary, much like the Louisianan authentic act, and
be conducted in the presence and with the consent of the parties or their
mandataries.341 However, the execution of the matrimonial agreement
1997); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 123A.080 (West 2019); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-
3A-7 (West 2019); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 32-925 (West 2019); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 
766.58 (West 2019).
332. Laura W. Morgan, The Uniform Premarital Agreement Act: What the
Law Says, and How Courts Are Interpreting It, 24-WTR FAM. ADVOC. 12 (2002).
333. See generally CARROLL & CARTER, supra note 38, at 1; CODE CIVIL [C.
CIV.] [CIVIL CODE] art. 1394 (Fr.).
334. See generally CARROLL & CARTER, supra note 38, at 1.
335. Id. 
336. CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] [CIVIL CODE] art. 1394 (Fr.).
337. See generally CARROLL & CARTER, supra note 38, at 8.
338. Id. 
339. A.L. Yiannapolous, Requiem for a Civil Code: A Commemorative Essay, 
78 TUL. L. REV. 379, 386–89 (2004).
340. CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] [CIVIL CODE] art. 1394 (Fr.).
341. French law differs from Louisiana law, in that a person standing in for the
spouse as a notary, or person with judicial authorization may be a party to the
matrimonial agreement in the spouse’s place. Id. art. 218, 1394.
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2021] COMMENT 1469
under the French law has an even greater cautionary function than the
execution of the matrimonial agreement under Louisiana law.342 
Particularly, French law expressly requires that spouses draft matrimonial
agreements before the marriage.343 Further, the agreements do not take
effect until the day of the marriage.344 
The French requirement that the spouses execute the matrimonial
agreement in the presence of a notary is a more stringent requirement than
the requirements under Louisiana law.345 Although a notary is a “protected
profession” in Louisiana, it is not held to the same standard as a civilian
notary.346 The French notary is considered an officer of the court and holds
his position for life.347 To qualify for the position of notary, a person must
meet the qualifications of an officier ministériel,348 or public officer. 
Additionally, a statute regulates the notary profession.349 The Chambre des
Notaires350 oversees notaries and their professional behavior and may even
invoke disciplinary action, including the loss of any political rights and the
right to vote, for disregarding notarial duties.351 Because French notaries 
are held to a higher standard, the execution of a matrimonial agreement in
the presence of one is a serious and deliberate gesture.352 
Through Act 627 in 1978, the Louisiana Legislature formerly
proposed requirements to execute a matrimonial agreement that more
closely matched the French requirements.353 Act 627 required the “solemn 
342. Id. art. 1395.
343. Id.
344. Id.
345. See generally Litvinoff & Scalise, supra note 23, § 12.15.
346. Id. 
347. See generally JENNINGS ET AL., supra note 226, at 65; Litvinoff & Scalise,
supra note 23, § 12.15.
348. As an officier minisériel, a French notary must “buy another notaire’s
office before he qualifies for official appointment.” To qualify for appointment,
an aspiring notary must pass an exam that is known to be particularly difficult.
Most people seeking to become qualified French notaries are also attorneys. An
applicant must also be of French nationality, have good character, have fulfilled
all military service obligations, and worked as a clerk in a notary office for at least 
six years. PETER E. HERZOG, CIVIL PROCEDURE IN FRANCE 102–03 (1967).
349. See Litvinoff & Scalise supra note 23, § 12.15.
350. The Chambre des Notaires, or Chamber of Notaries, is a professional
organization of notaries divided into local chapters with a national council in
Paris. Every member must join the Chambre des Notaires. HERZOG, supra note
348, at 106.
351. See generally Litvinoff & Scalise, supra note 23, § 12.15.
352. See generally id.
353. See Spaht & Samuel, supra note 28, at 92.
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1470 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81
formalities” of an authentic act to enter into a prenuptial agreement;
however, the legislature relaxed these requirements in the 1979 Revision
of the Louisiana Civil Code.354 This proposal aligned with the many
previous versions of the Louisiana Civil Code, which provided that
authentic acts were the only method for the execution of matrimonial
agreements, and explicitly excluded acts under private signature as a valid
method of execution.355 Scholars—who were present at the formal
meetings of groups concerned with the revision of the act, the legislative
committee hearings discussing the revision of the act, and the legislative
floor debates discussing the revision of the act—noted that the
legislature’s decision was “surprising,” considering the concern with
“spousal overreaching,” in other revised articles.356 The provision, which
formerly required the cautionary formalities of an authentic act, was
changed to allow execution by either an authentic act or an act under
private signature duly acknowledged, a lesser formality.357 
France, Louisiana, California, Washington, Arizona, Texas, Nevada,
New Mexico, Idaho, and Wisconsin have historic community property
regimes that implicate their jurisdictions’ policies.358 As such, these legal
systems strongly favor and protect their community property regimes.359 
Although the Louisiana Supreme Court’s decision in Acurio protected the 
public policy surrounding Louisiana’s community property regime, it
completely disregarded procedural form and skewed the act under private
signature’s function.360 
V. LEGISLATIVE INTERVENTION: A CHANGE TO THE CODE
The decision in Acurio v. Acurio reasonably imposed cautionary
protections for spouses entering into matrimonial agreements; however,
an act under private signature duly acknowledged is not a cautionary
protection.361 The Acurio Court incorrectly reasoned that entering a 
matrimonial agreement by an authentic act or acknowledgement is
354. Id.
355. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2308 (1825); id. art. 2328 (1920).
356. See Spaht & Samuel, supra note 28, at 92.
357. Id.
358. See generally CARROLL & CARTER, supra note 38, at 7–11; CODE CIVIL
[C. CIV.] [CIVIL CODE] arts. 218, 1394 (Fr.).
359. CARROLL & CARTER, supra note 38, at 7–11; CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] [CIVIL
CODE] arts. 218, 1394 (Fr.).
360. See Acurio v. Acurio, 224 So. 3d 935, 940 (La. 2017); LA. CIV. CODE art.
1836 (1984).
361. See Acurio, 224 So. 3d at 940; LA. CIV. CODE art. 1836 (1984).
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2021] COMMENT 1471
“superfluous” without requiring an act under private signature to be duly
acknowledged prior to the marriage.362 In many Louisiana Civil Code
articles, parties entering into agreements are given the option to execute
an authentic act or an act under private signature duly acknowledged, and
the language in these code articles is not “superfluous,” as 
acknowledgement can take place at any time.363 In Acurio, the Louisiana 
Supreme Court determined that when parties execute a matrimonial
agreement they must duly acknowledge their signatures before the
marriage and that acknowledgement at a later time would undermine the
option to execute the matrimonial agreement by authentic act.364 However,
the reasoning the Louisiana Supreme Court provided is contrary to the
operation of an authentic act in the rest of the Louisiana Civil Code.365 
Even if the Louisiana Supreme Court affirmed the Second Circuit
Court of Appeal’s decision that an act under private signature need not be
duly acknowledged until after the marriage, the error in interpretation of
Louisiana Civil Code article 2331 would persist.366 The Second Circuit’s
holding allows acknowledgment of the parties’ signatures to effectively
occur during depositions or court proceedings related to a divorce between
the parties.367 As a result, the spouses would likely only acknowledge their
signatures when the classification of property is at issue such as during
divorce proceedings, when creditors are seeking to foreclose on property,
or when the rights of heirs are involved.368 Consequently, the legislative
intent of requiring a cautionary intrusion for spouses before entering into 
matrimonial agreements is not met.369 
362. See Acurio, 224 So. 3d at 940.
363. Acurio, 224 So. 3d at 939; LA. REV. STAT. § 9:1752 (1964); LA. CIV.
CODE art. 116 (1998); LA. CIV. CODE art. 2339 (1980); LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art.
2635 (1989); Metro City Redevelopment Coal., Inc. v. Brockman, 143 So. 3d 495 
(La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 2014); LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art. 1836 (1985).
364. See Acurio, 224 So. 3d at 940.
365. Id.
366. See generally id.
367. See generally id.; see Surprenant, supra note 34.
368. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2345 (1979); LA. CIV. CODE art. 1505 (1996); LA. CIV.
CODE art. 105 (1991).
369. See generally Spaht & Samuel, supra note 28, at 90–92. (“[A]n 
acknowledgment of the execution of a contract, unlike an authentic act, does not 
entail the customary reading or paraphrasing by the notary of the act's contents to
the parties in the presence of the witnesses. The acknowledgment is thus not as 
likely as is an authentic act to alert a spouse to the seriousness of what he is doing.
It is, therefore, surprising that the lesser formalities are permitted in legislation
which, in its other provisions, is concerned with spousal overreaching.”).
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1472 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81
To rectify the Louisiana Supreme Court’s transgression, the
legislature should revise the Code to eliminate the act under private
signature duly acknowledged as a means of creating a matrimonial
agreement. The act under private signature duly acknowledged serves a 
solely evidentiary function in all other titles of the Louisiana Civil Code.370 
Alternatively, an authentic act serves both an evidentiary and cautionary
function as applied to other areas of Louisiana law.371 The legislature made
a clear indication that when parties are making decisions concerning
community property or contracting in a way that affects their matrimonial
regime, the law requires a cautionary function to ensure solemnity.372 The
legislature must modify Louisiana Civil Code article 2331 to allow for the
execution of a matrimonial agreement before the marriage only by the
more stringent form requirement: the authentic act. The legislature should
remove an act under private signature duly acknowledged as an option for
execution of a matrimonial agreement and revise Louisiana Civil Code
article 2331 to read: “A matrimonial agreement may be executed by the
spouses before or during marriage. This shall be executed by authentic
act.” Enacting this more heightened requirement will realign Louisiana
law with the French Code, ensure the legislative intent of establishing a
cautionary procedural safeguard, and restore consistency in the Louisiana
Civil Code.373 
Revising the article in this way would not only strengthen Louisiana
law’s policy of protecting the community property regime, but also align
Louisiana law more closely with that of other community property
states.374 In other community property states, more demanding
requirements must be met to enter into a prenuptial agreement such as
disclosure of property, financial ownership, and obligations.375 Indeed,
370. Id. art. 1836 (1984).
371. See generally Spaht & Samuel, supra note 28, at 92. (“[A]n 
acknowledgment of the execution of a contract, unlike an authentic act, does not 
entail the customary reading or paraphrasing by the notary of the act's contents to
the parties in the presence of the witnesses. The acknowledgment is thus not as 
likely as is an authentic act to alert a spouse to the seriousness of what he is doing.
It is, therefore, surprising that the lesser formalities are permitted in legislation
which, in its other provisions, is concerned with spousal overreaching.”).
372. Id.
373. See id. at 90; LA. CIV. CODE art. 2329 (1979); CARROLL & CARTER, supra
note 38, at 7.
374. See Acurio v. Acurio, 224 So. 3d 935, 940 (La. 2017).
375. See UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT § 6, 9B U.L.A. 376 (1987);
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-202 (2019); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 4.006 (West
1997); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 123A.080 (West 2019); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-
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2021] COMMENT 1473
disclosure is an inflexible requirement that spouses must follow.376 If the 
legislature revised Louisiana Civil Code article 2331 to require an 
authentic act to enter into a prenuptial agreement, the legislature would
make entering into prenuptial agreements more onerous on the parties,
similar to disclosure.377 The requirement for spouses to execute a
matrimonial agreement by authentic act would operate as a substitute for
explicitly requiring disclosure of assets prior to entering into the
agreement, while still carrying the same cautionary effect of disclosure.378 
The cautionary requirements of an authentic act, such as the presence
of a notary, help to ensure that the couples fully understand the legal
consequences of their matrimonial agreement.379 As a result, a separate
code article or statute requiring disclosure or legal counsel as a procedural
requirement is unnecessary because the cautionary effect intended by these
requirements is met in the execution of an authentic act.380 Washington
and California have demanding requirements, such as the need for each
party to have legal representation to enter into a matrimonial agreement.381 
The cautionary requirements of an authentic act, specifically the presence
of a notary, help to ensure that the couples have a full understanding of the
legal consequences of the agreement, the role that counsel plays in other
jurisdictions.382 A separate code article or statute that would require
disclosure or legal counsel as a prerequisite, as in other states, need not be 
created in Louisiana because the cautionary effect intended by these
requirements, of ensuring that the spouse has contemplated the legal
effects of the agreement, is met by the requirements of an authentic act.383 
3A-7 (West 2019); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 32-925 (West 2019); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 
766.58 (West 2019).





381. Kellar v. Estate of Kellar, 291 P.3d 906 (Wash. 2012); see UNIF.
PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT §6, 9B U.L.A. 376 (1987); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 25-202 (2019); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 4.006 (West 1997); NEV. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 123A.080 (West 2019); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-3A-7 (West 2019); IDAHO 
CODE ANN. § 32-925 (West 2019); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 766.58 (West 2019).
382. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1833 (2005); see UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT
§ 6, 9B U.L.A. 376 (1987); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-202 (2019); TEX. FAM.
CODE ANN. § 4.006 (West 1997); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 123A.080 (West
2019); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-3A-7 (West 2019); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 32-925 
(West 2019); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 766.58 (West 2019).
383. See generally Carroll & Moreno, supra note 59, § 8.6; UNIF. PREMARITAL 
AGREEMENT ACT § 6, 9B U.L.A. 376 (1987); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-202
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If an authentic act was the only means to execute a matrimonial 
agreement prior to marriage, the confusion of the spouses entering into
such agreements would be eliminated.384 As the multitude of cases 
presented to the circuit courts of appeal demonstrates, the article creates 
confusion for the spouses and the courts as presently written and
interpreted.385 Spouses who, although not fully executing a matrimonial
agreement by authentic act, later try to claim their agreements are valid 
because they met the requirements of an act under private signature duly
acknowledged.386 Revising the Louisiana Civil Code to express that a 
prenuptial agreement can only be executed by an authentic act creates a
limited and specific set of guidelines that must be followed before
marriage.387 A singular option presents spouses with streamlined
requirements.388 This simplified option would readily clarify to the
spouses and to courts interpreting the validity of the matrimonial
agreement whether or not the spouses have in fact executed the
requirements for a valid agreement.389 
CONCLUSION
The Louisiana Supreme Court incorrectly held in Acurio v. Acurio that
a matrimonial agreement should be executed by an act under private
signature duly acknowledged prior to marriage.390 Although the Court’s
decision aligned with the majority of appellate courts’ holdings, it ignored
the discrepancy between the interpretation of Louisiana Civil Code article
2331 and the rest of the Louisiana Civil Code.391 Cautionary procedural
safeguards are necessary to ensure that couples are prudent when entering
into a matrimonial agreement.392 As evident in other areas of Louisiana
(2019); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 4.006 (West 1997); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §
123A.080 (West 2019); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-3A-7 (West 2019); IDAHO CODE
ANN. § 32-925 (West 2019); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 766.58 (West 2019).
384. See Carroll & Moreno, supra note 59, § 8.6.
385. Id.
386. Id.
387. Id.; LA. CIV. CODE art. 2331 (1979).
388. Carroll & Moreno, supra note 59, § 8.6.
389. Id.
390. See Acurio v. Acurio, 224 So. 3d 935, 940 (La. 2017).
391. See Lauga v. Lauga, 537 So. 2d 758; Ritz v. Ritz, 666 So. 2d 1181 (La.
Ct. App. 5th Cir. 1995); Muller v. Muller, 72 So. 3d 364 (La. Ct. App. 5th Cir.
2011); Rush v. Rush, 115 So. 3d 508 (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 2013); Deshotels v.
Deshotels, 150 So. 3d 541 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 2014); Acurio v. Acurio, 197 So.
3d 253 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 2016); LA. CIV. CODE art. 1836 (1984).
392. See generally Spaht & Samuel, supra note 28, at 90.
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law, an act under private signature duly acknowledged is not a cautionary 
procedural safeguard.393 For this reason, the legislature should amend
Louisiana Civil Code article 2331 to remove an act under private signature
duly acknowledged as an option for executing a matrimonial agreement.
If the legislature would have previously amended article 2331 in this
way and applied it to the prenuptial agreement between Barry Bonds and
Sun, the outcome would likely have been much more financially favorable
for Sun.394 In fact, if Barry and Sun executed their matrimonial agreement
by authentic act, the presence of a notary and two witnesses may have
given Sun pause before she entered into the matrimonial agreement.395 The
notary would have re-read the agreement to ensure that Sun understood its
legal significance.396 Most importantly, Sun would have contemplated the 
legal consequences of the prenuptial agreement and at least hesitated, if 
not withdrawn, her consent to the agreement altogether.397 
393. See generally id. at 92.
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